

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 49185

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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CITE

DIST 14 FEBRUARY 1968

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY ARAB STATES/ISRAEL/USSR

DOI 5 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT COMMENTS BY SOVIET OFFICIAL ON THE POSSIBLE RENEWAL
OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES AND SOVIET INTENTIONS

ACQ

SOURCE

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

See page 5

1. COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS
THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED
REGARDING SOVIET PLANS TO PARTICIPATE IN A LIMITED ARAB
OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL.

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(dissem controls)

[REDACTED] THE
SOVIETS NOW BELIEVE A RENEWAL OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES WILL
OCCUR IN LATE SPRING. [REDACTED] HOSTILITIES
ARE INEVITABLE SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A VEHICLE FOR
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COMMENT: A SIMILAR REPORT FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT
WAS RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ACCORD-
ING TO THIS REPORT, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] EGYPT WAS PREPARING A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST
ISRAELI FORCES IN LATE FEBRUARY TO DRIVE THE ISRAELI FORCES
BACK "THREE OR FOUR MILES" FROM THE SUEZ CANAL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SEE BEIRUT EMBASSY
AIRGRAM A-639 DATED 31 JANUARY 1968. ANOTHER REPORT ON THE
POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES [REDACTED] RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY

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[REDACTED] STATED THAT THE UAR IS PLANNING TO RESUME HOSTILITIES BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME PESSIMISM OVER THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION OF UN SPECIAL ENVOY GUNNAR JARRING. MINISTER OF WAR FAWZI REPORTEDLY FAVORS AN ATTACK ON 5 JUNE 1968 WHILE PRESIDENT NASIR PREFERS AN EARLIER DATE, LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL, IF POSSIBLE. IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF IDENTIFICATION OF THE [REDACTED] INFORMANTS, THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO THE UAR LEADERS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION.)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY SOVIET ADVISORS [REDACTED] STAYED IN THE BACKGROUND AND [REDACTED] PLAYED A LIMITED ROLE IN SHAPING AND ORGANIZING ARAB ARMIES, THEY ARE NOW ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN REORGANIZING ARAB FORCES AND ENGAGING IN SOME COMMAND FUNCTIONS. [REDACTED] WHEN THE FIGHTING IS RENEWED, THE SOVIETS WILL ACTIVELY AID THE ARABS IN GAINING BACK THE TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE 1967 WAR. [REDACTED]

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SOVIET ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, WILL BE LIMITED TO REGAINING ONLY THAT TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE WAR.

COMMENT: THE SAME EMBASSY AIRGRAM CITED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ALSO STATED SOVIET ADVISORS WOULD DIRECT A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING EGYPT'S BARGAINING POSITION WITH ISRAEL. THE SAME

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ASSISTING THE UAR IN PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. THE SOVIETS HAVE ADVISED THE UAR THEY WILL SUPPORT AN ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL TO RECOVER THE TERRITORY LOST DURING THE JUNE WAR IF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL; BUT THE SOVIETS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT ISRAEL IS HERE TO STAY AND THAT THEY WILL NOT ACQUIESCE IN OR FACILITATE ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE "PUEBLO"

INCIDENT [REDACTED] DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE IT CLEAR IT WILL AVOID A COMMITMENT OF ITS FORCES ELSEWHERE. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERVENE ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF UNLESS THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS ARE CROSSED. IN VIEW OF THIS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE ARABS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO REGAIN THEIR LOST LANDS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN POWER POSITIONS [REDACTED] MAY RESULT IN A MAJOR ARAB MILITARY OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL BY JUNE 1968.)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL)

CINCMEAFSA [REDACTED]

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